Significance of Medicare and Medicaid Programs for the Practice of Medicine by DeWalt, Darren A. et al.
The 1965 legislation that established 
Medicare and Medicaid declared that the 
Federal Government would not interfere 
in clinical medicine. Despite the original 
intent, Medicare and Medicaid have had 
tremendous influence on medical practice. 
In this article, we focus on four policy areas 
that illustrate the influence of CMS (and its 
predecessor agencies) on medical practice. 
We discuss the implications of the relation-
ship between CMS and clinical medicine 
and how this relationship has changed over 
time. We conclude with thoughts about poten-
tial future efforts at CMS.  
“Nothing in this title shall be construed to 
authorize any Federal officer or employee 
to exercise any supervision or control over 
the practice of medicine or the manner in 
which medical services are provided...” 
(Public Law 89-97.)
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding what Congress wrote in 
1965, the Medicare and Medicaid Programs 
have enormous influence over the prac-
tice of medicine. The evolution of medical 
care, its financing, and the expectations of 
the American population for high-quality 
care and rational use of public funds have 
linked, irreversibly, CMS to clinical medi-
cine.1  CMS finances health care for more 
Americans than any other single entity; the 
agency has a responsibility to its benefi-
ciaries to ensure that they receive quality, 
effective, and efficient health care. As with 
other payers, CMS must answer to both 
the beneficiaries it serves and the investors 
(taxpayers); in addition, CMS must address 
the concerns of an array of political con-
stituents, including Congress, presidential 
administrations, and groups representing 
the health care industry. To balance these 
competing interests and pursue evolving 
policy goals, CMS has had no choice but to 
become engaged in the practice of medicine 
and the delivery of health care services. 
Now, 40 years into the life of Medicare 
and Medicaid, we reflect on how clinical 
medicine has become intertwined with CMS 
by highlighting four key policy areas that 
illustrate this changing relationship: (1) the 
end-stage renal disease (ESRD) program, 
(2) the quality improvement organizations 
and the effectiveness initiative, (3) financ-
ing of graduate medical education, and (4) 
State Medicaid activities. We discuss these 
policy initiatives, not as an exhaustive listing, 
but to demonstrate both the broad range 
of activities that CMS engages in and how 
those activities have evolved over time as 
CMS’ influence over clinical medicine has 
increased. CMS’ influence stems from both 
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regulatory decisions by the policymakers 
in the agency and from legislative decisions 
made by the Congress. Both avenues of 
influence are important and are exemplified 
in this article. The article concludes with 
thoughts about the future of CMS’ relation-
ship with medical practice.  
BaCKgROUND 
Organized medicine staunchly opposed 
the passage of Medicare, in part to keep 
government out of clinical medicine. The 
American Medical Association (AMA), 
reversing its initial supportive stance, 
declared its opposition to compulsory 
health insurance in 1920 and in subse-
quent decades became a powerful lobby 
against enactment of universal health 
insurance and its political legacy, Medicare 
(Oberlander, 2003). Precisely because of 
the opposition to national health insurance, 
political realities forced policymakers to 
focus on insuring the elderly and mini-
mizing the regulatory role of Medicare 
in medical practice. Without conceding 
to the AMA and limiting the program’s 
regulatory authority, Federal policymakers 
would have found it much more difficult 
to gain the medical profession’s coopera-
tion in implementing Medicare. Yet this 
limitation on regulation became untenable 
within just 5 years of Medicare’s introduc-
tion; since that time, Federal policymakers 
have become increasingly involved and 
influential in clinical medicine.
Because of the weakness of regulatory 
oversight and the use of unfettered fee-
for-service payment in the program’s early 
years, Medicare quickly proved to be a 
blank check for the health care industry. 
This payment structure was not unique to 
the Federal programs since private health 
insurance plans generally used similarly 
inflationary arrangements. Medicare’s aim 
was to finance access for the elderly to 
mainstream medicine and, in 1965, the 
mainstream of American medicine showed 
little concern for cost control or quality 
oversight.
Indeed, before the 1970s, U.S. health 
care policy was based on two broad assump-
tions: (1) Americans needed more medical 
care, and (2) medical professionals were 
the best arbiters of the use of health care 
services (Starr, 1982). Physicians enjoyed 
virtually unchallenged clinical autonomy. 
The number of visits or lengths of hospital 
stays were generally not influenced by the 
payer; rather, they were determined at the 
discretion of physicians. This financing 
policy did not hold physicians or hospitals 
accountable for decisions made in patient 
care and no clear standard for over- or 
underutilization of health services existed. 
Not surprisingly, then, the use of health 
services and expenditures skyrocketed in 
Medicare’s and Medicaid’s early years. As 
a result, policymakers’ attention quickly 
turned to reforms that would reign in gov-
ernment spending on health care (though 
decisive action was slower to take hold). 
Evidence suggests that Medicare and 
Medicaid successfully enhanced access 
to medical care for low-income and elder-
ly Americans (Davis and Schoen, 1978). 
But it is unclear whether the expansion 
of health care utilization in the first few 
years of Medicare and Medicaid could 
be attributed mostly to increasing access 
to and utilization of needed services or 
to unregulated overuse of health care. 
Likewise, it is unclear whether Medicare 
and Medicaid predominantly increased use 
of inappropriate health care services or, 
instead, increased, in substantial amounts, 
both appropriate and inappropriate use. 
If the latter, one could not argue that 
Medicare and Medicaid actually changed 
the practice of clinical medicine, but rather 
that the programs simply expanded its 
availability. Regardless, subsequent policy 
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decisions changed the course of Medicare 
and Medicaid and undoubtedly influenced 
medical practice. We turn now to four 
policy areas that exemplify CMS’ evolving 
relationship with clinical medicine.
eSRD Program
The ESRD program is the only disease-
specific coverage ever offered by Medicare. 
The medical procedure enabling chronic 
hemodialysis was invented in 1960 and 
pressure soon grew for Federal funding to 
insure access to the life-saving treatment; 
the National Kidney Foundation and a 
small group of physician kidney special-
ists spearheaded the lobbying campaign. 
ESRD was added to Medicare (along with 
eligibility for disabled persons) in 1972, 
part of congressional horse trading that 
gave Senator Long, (Democrat-Louisiana), 
ESRD in place of the Medicare drug ben-
efit that he had sought to enact. Long 
advocated catastrophic health insurance as 
an alternative to comprehensive national 
health insurance, and saw ESRD as a dem-
onstration of (and prelude to) a universal 
coverage system based on catastrophic 
insurance (Nissenson and Rettig, 1999; 
Schreiner, 2000; and Oberlander, 2003). 
When national health insurance, through 
catastrophic coverage or any other model, 
failed to materialize, ESRD remained in 
Medicare as the Federal Government’s 
only universal, disease-specific coverage 
program.  
ESRD’s contribution to health care is 
obvious: the program has clearly saved 
hundreds of thousands of lives. Yet ESRD 
also represents a significant policy conun-
drum for Medicare because the numbers of 
ESRD cases are expected to rise and care 
for ESRD patients is expensive. In 2002, 
Medicare spent $41,696 per ESRD ben-
eficiary, compared with $6,002 per elderly 
enrollee (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). 
With the rapid increase in the prevalence 
of type II diabetes and the aging of the pop-
ulation, the annual number of new patients 
entering the ESRD program is expected to 
increase from 100,359 in 2002 to 460,000 in 
2030 (Collins et al., 2005). 
The Medicare ESRD program has had an 
important influence on clinical medicine. 
Beyond the effect of initiating coverage for 
ESRD, program developments reveal the 
close relationship between Medicare and 
what actually happens in the clinical care 
of patients on dialysis. Early in the experi-
ence of the ESRD program, administrators 
realized the potential high costs of the pro-
gram and began to design strategies to con-
tain those costs. For example, outpatient 
dialysis has been capitated since 1973, and 
CMS has included more and more services 
within the capitated payment (Nissenson 
and Rettig, 1999). As such, dialysis centers 
have had to become more efficient over 
time and have used such cost-saving tech-
niques as reusing dialysis filters and using 
less well trained technicians to adminis-
ter dialysis (National Kidney Foundation, 
1997). Although these steps have been 
frequently debated, dialysis filter reuse 
does not appear to increase the risk of 
adverse outcomes (Port et al., 2001). As 
payment to dialysis centers over time has 
stayed level or decreased, the importance 
of ongoing quality monitoring of dialysis 
care has increased (Institute of Medicine 
Committee for the Study of the Medicare 
End-Stage Renal Disease Program, 1991).
Another example of CMS’ effect on clini-
cal medicine was the decision to deny pay-
ment for erythropoietin (EPO) if a patient’s 
hematocrit was greater than 36.5. EPO is 
a naturally occurring protein produced by 
the kidneys that triggers the production 
of red blood cells; it improves survival 
and quality of life among dialysis patients 
(Eschbach, 1994). Target hematocrit for 
patients on dialysis is 33 to 36, so it was 
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thought reasonable to stop administration 
of EPO when the hematocrit was above 
this range. However, the policy actually led 
to more frequent episodes of a hematocrit 
below 33 as physicians were concerned 
about reimbursement denial and more 
likely to withhold EPO therapy for patients 
in the higher range (Berns et al., 2005; 
Nissenson and Rettig, 1999). As such, 
many ESRD patients were not receiving 
optimal care for their disease. CMS subse-
quently changed the policy to a cut-point of 
37.5 at the urging of Congress and advo-
cates in the renal community (Nissenson 
and Rettig, 1999). Through these policies, 
CMS inserted itself into the patient-spe-
cific clinical decisions of physicians. This 
also illustrates how data and analysis can 
help to inform policy as CMS was able to 
increase the cut-point based on effective-
ness studies (Berns et al., 2005; Nissenson 
and Rettig, 1999). At the same time as they 
adjusted the payment rules for dialysis 
providers, CMS strengthened its oversight 
and management of dialysis providers and 
began to pay closer attention to the quality 
of care provided for ESRD patients.
In 1978, Congress approved the creation 
of ESRD networks that served to collect 
data related to the care provided within 
the network and to initiate quality improve-
ment (Social Security Amendments of 
1978) (Public Law 95-292). The networks 
meet at a national forum each year to share 
data and ideas for improving quality of care 
nationally. The ESRD networks have likely 
had a substantial role in the improvement 
of care for patients with ESRD and the cor-
responding decrease in mortality and mor-
bidity (McClellan et al., 2003). Additionally, 
the improvements made through the ESRD 
networks have reduced racial disparities in 
adequacy of hemodialysis (Sehgal, 2003). 
By recognizing the relationship between 
financing and quality of care and then cre-
ating a framework for improvement, CMS 
has participated in improving the clinical 
care of hundreds of thousands of ESRD 
patients.
Quality Improvement Organizations 
and effectiveness Initiative
In light of skyrocketing costs in Medicare 
and Medicaid, as well as concerns over 
fraud and abuse, Congress decided by the 
early 1970s that closer oversight of the 
medical care system was necessary. The 
concern was that excess budgetary costs 
were related to overuse of medical services, 
driven by uncontrolled financial incentive 
systems built into the original legislation. 
The first attempt to address overuse was 
the creation of Experimental Medical Care 
Review Organizations (EMCROs) in 1971 
(Bhatia et al., 2000). These organizations 
reviewed health service use in an effort 
to improve the quality of care. They were 
housed at the National Center for Health 
Services Research, and not at CMS. 
EMCROs were the prototype for the pro-
fessional standards review organizations 
(PSROs) that were established in 1972. 
Interestingly, the AMA involved itself in 
the development of the PSROs because 
they recognized the potential threat of such 
organizations to physicians’ clinical autono-
my (Oberlander, 2003). The AMA proposed 
that the State medical societies serve as 
the PSROs, thus leaving control over medi-
cal practice within the profession. In the 
end, Congress agreed with the AMA that 
physicians should perform the reviews, as 
they were uniquely suited for the role, but 
decided that State medical societies would 
not retain the right to provide this service 
(Oberlander, 2003). In fact, PSROs were 
held accountable by Congress and their 
contracts could be terminated if they were 
not fulfilling their role adequately.
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By the early 1980s, continued frustration 
with rising program costs led to the devel-
opment of new payment and monitoring 
systems that expanded CMS’ regulatory 
authority and influence. A key response to 
escalating costs was to change regulatory 
tools, both in terms of payment and clini-
cal oversight. This change was spurred by 
congressional action in slowing Medicare 
spending in the context of rising bud-
get deficits. The prospective payment sys-
tem (PPS), enacted by Congress in 1983, 
sought to control hospitalization costs by 
paying hospitals a fixed rate based on 
the patient’s diagnosis during admission 
(payment was based on diagnosis-related 
groups) (Social Security Amendments of 
1983) (Public Law 98-21). Prior to prospec-
tive payment, hospitals and physicians did 
not have strong financial incentives to pro-
vide efficient care. By implementing this 
strategy, CMS attempted to relate clinical 
compensation to the resources needed for 
patient care. The PPS provided a strong 
incentive for hospitals to provide fewer ser-
vices during an admission and shorten the 
length of stay. The role of CMS as regulato-
ry agency became even more important: it 
had to monitor for both overuse and unde-
ruse of appropriate medical care. With the 
evolving role of these entities, the PSROs 
were remodeled into the peer review orga-
nizations (PROs) (Bhatia et al., 2000). 
The initial model of operation for the 
PRO was similar to that of the PSRO. 
Structurally, the PROs differed in that they 
were consolidated into State level regions. 
Functionally, they still relied on retrospec-
tive review of cases and, consequently, 
delayed education or correction of outly-
ing providers. Physicians often maintained 
an adversarial relationship with the PROs. 
Nor did the PROs offer much in the way 
of tangible results: they did not achieve 
substantial cost savings or quality improve-
ments (Oberlander, 2003). 
The most important paradigm shift in 
Federal policy regarding quality of care 
began in the contract period starting in 
1993. Taking advantage of quality improve-
ment knowledge from other industries, 
CMS charged the PROs to develop pro-
spective quality improvement initiatives. 
This model required a change in the rela-
tionship between PROs and the physicians 
and hospitals they served. The PROs had 
to develop a cooperative relationship and 
move away from an adversarial culture 
(Bradley et al., 2005). The idea was to 
focus on process improvement and systems 
based thinking rather than isolating unusu-
al errors (Jencks and Wilensky, 1992). 
In 2003, better reflecting the evolution of 
their mission, the PROs were renamed as 
quality improvement organizations (QIOs). 
Recent studies have come to differing 
conclusions regarding the effectiveness 
of QIOs at improving care (Jencks, Huff, 
and Cuerdon, 2003; Snyder and Anderson, 
2005; Gaul, 2005; Bradley et al., 2005). 
The question of QIO effectiveness has 
remained elusive because of the difficulty 
of conducting rigorous studies that dem-
onstrate cause and effect (Jencks, Huff, 
and Cuerdon, 2003; Snyder and Anderson, 
2005). QIOs clearly give CMS an important 
tool to influence quality outcomes, and 
ongoing evaluation of their effectiveness 
and improvement of that effectiveness is 
warranted. 
In 1988, CMS launched the effective-
ness initiative to evaluate and improve the 
practice of medicine (Roper et al., 1988). 
Because of the enormous potential for 
the use of data from large populations to 
study medical effectiveness, CMS commit-
ted itself to refining its data system and to 
linking with clinical researchers to better 
understand and analyze the data. As a result, 
CMS could offer clearer information on the 
health outcomes achieved from health ser-
vices in regular practice. This campaign, 
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started by CMS, became a core function of 
a sister Federal agency called the Agency 
for Health Care Policy and Research (now 
called the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality) and continues today. CMS 
has also used the effectiveness initiative to 
improve the work of the QIOs by helping 
to inform quality improvement through 
analysis and interpretation of outcomes 
data. Through understanding the effects of 
care and its variation, CMS was in a much 
better position to educate care providers 
on quality than it had been previously.  
Through activities like the effectiveness 
initiative and advances in data manage-
ment, CMS can begin to address the enor-
mous variation in care according to geog-
raphy (Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner, 
2002). Such variation, which is not associ-
ated with differences in outcomes, repre-
sents a tremendous opportunity for CMS 
to control costs. By understanding the pat-
terns of care that yield the best outcomes 
at the least cost, CMS can begin to use its 
influence to get physicians to adopt the 
most efficient models.
The experience of the EMCRO-PSRO-
PRO-QIOs and the effectiveness initiative 
illustrates CMS’ changing relationship with 
clinical medicine. Although the process 
began as a regulatory model, it has evolved 
into a quality improvement function with 
the goal of changing how medicine is 
practiced. This reflects the evolution of 
Medicare administration from an initial 
charge of financing care to its current mis-
sion that incorporates concerns of improv-
ing the quality of care delivered to program 
beneficiaries as well as cost control. 
Financing graduate Medical 
education
Congress assigned Medicare a role 
in financing graduate medical education 
(GME), (Social Security Amendments of 
1965) (Public Law 89-97) under the assump-
tion that GME is a public good and should 
be supported by the Federal Government. 
As such, CMS helps to shape the quality 
and size of the workforce of future physi-
cians. Additionally, CMS policy changes 
have substantial effects on the financial 
health of America’s teaching hospitals. 
Before the 1980s, Medicare allowed 
teaching hospitals to be reimbursed for 
their reasonable costs, including the cost 
of GME. In the early 1980s, along with the 
PPS, Medicare began making direct and 
indirect medical education payments to 
teaching hospitals. Direct medical educa-
tion (DME) payments are intended to off-
set the actual cost of employing a resident. 
The indirect medical education (IME) pay-
ments offset the higher cost of care at teach-
ing hospitals because of the higher tech-
nology, increased testing, and increased 
severity of illness. Contemporaneous with 
these payments, residency programs grew. 
DME funding totaled $2.6 billion in fiscal 
year 2002, intended to support the salaries 
and other direct costs of residents, and 
IME payments totaled $6.2 billion in sup-
port (Dickinson, 2004). The policy ratio-
nale for the indirect payments has been 
hotly debated, and many believe it should 
include compensation to hospitals for the 
greater severity of unmeasured case-mix 
associated with hospitals with teaching 
programs. 
The number of residents nationally 
totaled 61,465 in 1980 and 98,076 in 1996. 
With the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
Congress capped the number of residents 
eligible for Federal subsidy at 1996 levels 
(Public Law 105-33[H.R. 2015]). At the 
same time, Congress began to reign in 
the IME budget by substantially reducing 
the additional payment to teaching hospi-
tals. Congress has modified the formulas 
determining the levels of DME and IME 
support several times over the past decade, 
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attempting to reduce any fiscal incentives 
to increase the number of training slots. 
Additional reduction in slots reimbursed 
and further cuts in IME levels have been 
considered; such possibilities raise great 
concern for the fiscal health of academic 
medical centers at a time when the U.S. 
may face a relative shortage of many spe-
cialties (Cooper, 2004; Weiner, 2002). The 
multiple incentives to use residents to pro-
vide clinical services include their low cost, 
high motivation, and skill levels; their work 
capacity, despite recently being reduced to 
80 hours per week, is still far greater than 
that likely to be realized from any replace-
ment physician or mid-level provider. The 
pressures that reductions in GME subsi-
dies generate may influence the quality of 
education of future physicians. In this case, 
physicians argue that Congress, through 
CMS policy, substantially influences the 
direction of our workforce and the financial 
health of the institutions that drive innova-
tion in medical care.
Immediately after the 1997 legislative 
changes, several prominent teaching insti-
tutions had substantial financial losses 
(Coughlan et al., 2000). Since then, teach-
ing hospitals have had increasing difficulty 
maintaining positive operating margins, 
which can be partially attributed to the 
reduction in IME payments (Phillips et 
al., 2004). Because of the reduced fund-
ing of residency positions, as well as the 
diminished attractiveness of primary care 
specialties, some programs have closed, 
(Phillips et al., 2004) and most others have 
been forced to re-evaluate their mission 
(Rich et al., 2002). Teaching faculty are 
often encouraged to participate in activi-
ties that are revenue generating rather 
than focusing on their role as educators 
for tomorrow’s physicians. The Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission has issued 
recommendations to consider GME fund-
ing from a purely economic argument 
to allow more market-driven changes in 
GME (Newhouse and Wilensky, 2001), but 
the proposed market-driven approach may 
undermine the professional ethos of medi-
cine (Gbadebo and Reinhardt, 2001). 
GME financing has substantial influ-
ence on the nature of future medical care. 
By altering GME payment structures or 
physician fee rates, CMS can dramatically 
change the medical education of future 
physicians. The immediate effects relate 
to actual patient care practices in teaching 
hospitals by altering the balance of teach-
ing and medical care by the faculty. Long-
term effects on the size of the workforce 
and specialty choice are both inevitable 
and difficult to predict given past problems 
in projecting workforce needs, as well as 
the multiple financial and clinical influ-
ences changing the staffing and clinical 
activities of the nation’s academic medical 
centers. 
Unique Role of Medicaid Programs 
On the Federal level, Medicare has 
received much more attention than 
Medicaid over the past 40 years, a conse-
quence of Medicaid’s decentralized admin-
istrative structure that gives States primary 
responsibility for its operations. However, 
within individual States, Medicaid initia-
tives have had specific influence on the 
practice of medicine. We focus here on 
North Carolina to illustrate how initiatives 
aimed at improving quality in Medicaid are 
pursued at the State level.
In North Carolina, the Medicaid Program 
has been active in promoting quality improve-
ment and efficiency. The State’s Department 
of Health and Human Services has fostered 
the development of Community Care of 
North Carolina which convenes networks 
of primary care providers to coordinate the 
care of populations of patients (Ricketts et 
al., 2004). These networks support local 
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disease management and case coordination 
for Medicaid enrollees, and member physi-
cians agree to participate in network activi-
ties and to follow network guidelines for the 
care of specific chronic illnesses. An evalu-
ation of this program revealed that, com-
pared with the standard Medicaid Program 
within the State, the Community Care of 
North Carolina program saved money for 
the State and improved some outcomes 
for patients (Ricketts et al., 2004). Other 
States have implemented different models 
of disease management with varying levels 
of success, and all with the intent of improv-
ing health outcomes while controlling costs 
(Wheatley, 2001).
In partnership with the Center for Chil-
dren’s Healthcare Improvement (CCHI), 
the North Carolina Medicaid Program has 
also demonstrated several improvements 
in care delivery. Much of the work has 
focused on care for children, and working 
with practices on quality improvement, 
the CCHI and Medicaid have document-
ed improvements in preventive services 
(Margolis et al., 2004), care for patients 
with asthma (Schmid 2004),  and reduced 
waiting times to see physicians (Bundy et 
al., 2005). By supporting the infrastructure 
for such collaborative efforts, the State has 
enabled practices to improve the timeli-
ness of care and also to reduce the rate of 
no-shows to clinic appointments. 
Despite the successes seen in North 
Carolina and some other States, Medicaid 
Programs face constraints in pursuing 
quality initiatives. Because of State budget 
problems, policymakers frequently do not 
have the resources needed to administer 
adequately such programs, much less lead 
quality improvement efforts. In addition, 
the information systems and data analysis 
capabilities developed under Medicare are 
not available for most Medicaid Programs 
and decisions on effectiveness are less well 
informed.  
Implications of Involvement in 
Clinical Medicine 
We have outlined selected examples of 
how Medicare and Medicaid have influ-
enced clinical medicine. Medicare and 
Medicaid emerged from a fierce political 
process in 1965 with the charge to stay 
away from clinical medicine. Early on, how-
ever, Federal administrators recognized 
that Medicare and Medicaid could not 
control costs or ensure quality without 
regulation. As regulation developed, it took 
several years for the Federal Government 
to adopt the strategy of prospective qual-
ity improvement through partnership with 
the medical community. This strategy has 
much promise for improving medical care. 
Was it a mistake for CMS to engage in 
changing clinical practice?  We decided, as 
a country, to create a safety net of public 
health insurance for the elderly and the 
poor. Like every other payer in the coun-
try, CMS was responsible to those who 
pay for the services (the American tax-
payer) and those who receive care under 
their auspices (Medicare beneficiaries 
and Medicaid enrollees). The American 
taxpayer, through Congress, should have 
oversight of the care provided by those 
who invoice CMS and, therefore, receive 
public funds. CMS and Congress have the 
responsibility of ensuring the best quality 
of care possible for program beneficiaries. 
Additionally, because CMS is the larg-
est single insurance organization in the 
Nation, its initiatives are likely to shape 
policy well beyond its programs, in the 
commercial market in the United States 
and even abroad. Eliminating CMS influ-
ence from clinical medicine would not only 
be infeasible, it would be a tremendous 
opportunity lost.
We anticipate that CMS will continue 
its role to improve health care quality by 
informing clinical care with data, taking a 
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larger role in chronic disease management, 
and developing new systems that reward 
high quality care. Data technology will now 
allow analysis of close to real-time data and 
linkage of inpatient, outpatient, and phar-
macy databases to facilitate more rapid 
cycles in quality improvement. CMS’ most 
recent initiative for the QIOs will actively 
help physician practices to adopt electronic 
health records (Medicare News, 2005). In 
addition to the inpatient efforts noted, 
CMS also participates with the Ambulatory 
Care Quality Alliance, along with other 
insurers and major physician organiza-
tions, to advance quality in outpatient care 
settings. And CMS has embarked on large-
scale demonstration projects to determine 
whether pay-for-performance and disease 
management programs can save money 
and improve quality. All these programs 
reflect the growing partnerships between 
CMS and hospitals and physician orga-
nizations. It has taken almost 40 years to 
develop these types of relationships across 
American health care, but such partner-
ships now have the potential to yield sub-
stantial benefits in the health care system.
Future efforts at CMS 
We can identify four key areas that CMS 
should address in the coming years with 
respect to influencing clinical medicine. 
First, CMS must successfully implement 
the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). 
Second, CMS should devote more resourc-
es toward understanding the appropriate 
role for the Medicaid Program and how 
the Nation finances care for the most vul-
nerable segments of society. The States 
have conducted many experiments with 
payment and disease management, and 
CMS should facilitate sharing the lessons 
learned. Third, CMS should improve and 
develop close collaboration with other pri-
vate insurers to enable the pooling of data 
and cooperative improvement of care. And 
fourth, CMS can lead by changing the 
paradigm of financing medical care based 
on acute care to one that pays for chronic 
illness care. 
The MMA authorized several key pro-
grams that will enhance the quality of 
medical care for the elderly in the U.S. Of 
particular note is the emphasis on chronic 
disease management programs. Our entire 
health care system has struggled with how 
to retool to care for patients with chronic 
disease rather than acute illness. CMS 
is directly assessing the effect of disease 
management programs operated outside 
of routine clinical care settings. Other 
movements across the country are trying 
to remodel the clinical care system from 
within to provide better chronic illness 
care (Casalino, 2005). Regardless of the 
model used, these strategies have promise 
for improving quality and reducing costs 
by changing the way physicians and their 
practices care for their patients. 
Over the past 40 years, Federal admin-
istrators have focused more attention on 
the Medicare Program than on Medicaid. 
Nonetheless, Medicaid today is a far dif-
ferent—and dramatically larger—program 
than it was in its early years, and, as 
its enrollment has expanded, eligibility is 
no longer as tightly connected to welfare 
status as it was at Medicaid’s start. The 
unique nature of the Federal-State partner-
ship for Medicaid has led to substantial 
diversity in program operations, includ-
ing eligibility levels and delivery systems, 
across the States. The local infrastructure 
and efficiency of a State-based program 
remains attractive, but translation of inno-
vation from one State to the next has been 
slow. Moreover, although a few States have 
used Medicaid expansions to reduce sig-
nificantly their rates of uninsurance, most 
States have lacked the financial capacity 
and political will to follow their lead. In 
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its role overseeing the State programs, 
CMS should continue to push the States 
to expand coverage and improve quality 
in Medicaid, although the financing chal-
lenges will be substantial. Additionally, 
rapid availability of State Medicaid data, 
similar to the planned rapid availability of 
Medicare data, will facilitate cross-State 
comparisons. We see great opportunities 
for expanding the role of Medicaid in 
working to improve quality of clinical care 
across the Nation.  
CMS also will need to consider its role as 
a convener of private industry to advance 
data use to improve medical care. In this 
area, data aggregation and analysis should 
expand to include data from Medicaid and 
private insurance companies. Providers 
of medical care in America answer to a 
large number of different payers that all 
collect data on patients. Those data are 
rarely aggregated to inform public policy 
or individual clinical care. CMS can take a 
leadership role to expand health informa-
tion systems and the use of data in routine 
clinical care. CMS will need to work with 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality and private insurance companies to 
accomplish this goal. 
Private and public health insurance 
financing emerged in an era in which most 
of medicine was focused on care for acute 
illnesses. Largely because of the successes 
in acute care and resultant rises in longev-
ity, a large share of the current health care 
dollar is now spent on patients with chronic 
illnesses. The optimal care for chronic ill-
ness requires a comprehensive approach 
that includes self-management support, 
community resources, decision support, 
information systems, and a redesigned 
delivery system (Wagner, 1998). Such a 
model of care requires creative financing 
strategies to motivate high quality care. 
For example, ensuring access to self-man-
agement support (education, telephone, 
and E-mail consultation) will require a dif-
ferent financing structure (Spann, 2004). 
Current demonstrations in chronic disease 
management and pay-for-performance are 
a start, but our health care system has 
a long way to go before incentives are 
aligned to support chronic illness care.
CONClUSION
CMS policy has tremendous influence 
on clinical medicine. Although the initial 
statutes declared otherwise, it did not take 
long to show that regulation was a key 
component for ensuring and promoting 
quality. CMS policy has evolved over the 
years to now focus on quality improve-
ment and partnerships across governmen-
tal agencies and private industry. CMS 
should continue to pursue its responsibility 
for providing access to needed care and 
ensuring quality. As such, we expect CMS 
will continue to provide further incentives 
for high quality care and to invest resourc-
es toward improving substandard care. 
By pursuing this agenda, we believe that 
CMS can apply appropriate tools to imple-
ment the MMA, devote more attention to 
Medicaid, work with private industry to 
develop the data infrastructure to move 
medical care forward, and change the 
paradigm in financing to support chronic 
illness care.
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